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IAC-D-97
18 August 1955

IAC TASK FORCE
ON PRESIDENT'S PROPOSAL
PROPOSED TERMS OF REFERENCE

I. INTRODUCTION

1. The IAC asked the Task Force to study US intelligence requirements and implications of any program designed to implement the President's proposal for a US-Soviet exchange of military blueprints and aerial inspection.

The President's Proposal

"I propose, therefore, that we take a practical step, that we begin an arrangement, very quickly, as between ourselves -- immediately. These steps would include:

"To give to each other a complete blueprint of our military establishments, from beginning to end, from one end of our countries to the other, lay out the establishments and provide the blueprints to each other.

"Next, to provide within our countries facilities for aerial photography to the other country -- we to provide you the facilities within our country, ample facilities for aerial reconnaissance, where you can make all the pictures you choose and take them to your own country to study, you to provide exactly the same facilities for us and we to make these examinations and by this step convince the world that we are providing as between ourselves against the possibility of great surprise attack, thus lessening danger and relaxing tension."

2. The President's proposal falls under the general heading of "security," as opposed to disarmament; more specifically under the

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heading of "military security," security of the nation against military attack by the USSR. More specifically still, the President's proposal aims at providing against the element of surprise in the event of attack or as he stated, "great surprise attack." The President's proposal would superimpose on existing means of intelligence collection a method which would provide evidence from direct observation, although limited by the media themselves.

3. It is noted that the President's proposal calls for the exchange of a "complete blueprint of our military establishments," and for "aerial reconnaissance" which appears to be restricted to aerial photography. Since such limitation may be more implied than intended, the task force proposes to consider other means of inspection as well.

4. "Great surprise attack" is interpreted to mean any surprise attack which would jeopardize the basic strengths and interests of the United States. (Minor border clashes or incidents would not be included.) Such an attack would involve direct assault to the full extent of Soviet military capabilities, including the use of mass destruction weapons (atomic, biological and/or chemical).

5. The President's proposal calls for a bilateral arrangement between the US and the USSR in order to "convince the world that we are providing as between ourselves against the possibility of great surprise attack." Because one cannot separate US security realistically from intelligence of Soviet-controlled and closely allied areas and because one cannot separate US security realistically from that of allied powers, especially those wherein US forward bases are located, the IAC believes that the areas to be inspected may go beyond continental limits of the US and the USSR.

II. DEFINITION OF THE INTELLIGENCE PROBLEM

To develop the intelligence requirements necessary to insure the US against a surprise attack by the USSR and to analyze the possibility of their satisfaction under any conditions for exchange of information and any conditions for mutual inspection.

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a. Method of Procedure: First to establish the requirements and then to define the media, if possible, in such fashion as to provide information constituting an acceptable minimum of protection against surprise attack.

b. The requirements should be developed and organized in a manner which will cover: first, the strictest interpretation of the proposal, viz. surprise attack from the USSR proper against the US proper; second, successively broader interpretations which would (1) expand the area from which surprise attack could be launched to include Soviet allied and satellite territory, (2) expand the target of attack to include US forward bases and US allies, and (3) provide for protection against the secret development of relatively greater Soviet military capabilities.

III. ASSUMPTIONS

It is assumed that:

a. The Soviet Union accepts the President's proposal.

b. The Task Force is not concerned with the various contingencies that will arise in the course of negotiations, but only with the determination of those intelligence requirements and the conditions for their satisfaction adequate to insure advance knowledge of preparations for attack.

IV. DISCUSSION

A. Intelligence Requirements

1. Inasmuch as this section of the study goes to the heart of our military intelligence problem with respect to the Communist power, it is proposed that each service develop its own lists in accordance with II (2) above, and that these lists then be consolidated under the appropriate headings. As for example, the first list:

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Attack against the continental US from bases within the USSR:

- a. Bases from which air attacks could be launched against the US.
- b. Order of Battle of Long-Range Air forces.
- c. Production facilities for long-range aircraft.
- d. Storage and assembly points for nuclear weapons.
- e. Production facilities for nuclear weapons.
- f. Launching facilities for Intercontinental Ballistic Missiles.
- g. Order of Battle for ICBM units.
- h. Production and storage facilities for ICBM's.
- i. Fleet bases, submarine loadings and dispositions.
- j. Order of Battle of Soviet long-range submarines.
- k. Production and Storage facilities for BW and CW agents.

The second list would be supplementary to the first: For example:

Attack against US forces and installations abroad from bases within the USSR:

- a. Army forces in forward areas.
- b. Forward airbases in areas of the USSR adjacent to locations of US forces abroad.
- c. Order of Battle of Soviet ground forces.
- d. Order of Battle of Soviet tactical airforces.
- e. Military stockpiles in forward areas.

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f. Transportation system serving forward units.

(NOTE: The additional supplementary lists would be similarly constructed to exhaust the possibilities mentioned in II b. above.)

2. The individual items listed under the appropriate headings would be accompanied by a brief justification and explanation of its critical character, such that the lists could serve as an initial handbook or guide, for the study of "blueprints," for purposes of aerial photography and interpretation, or for other means of inspection.

3. Consideration must be given to the degree of adequacy of our intelligence relating to the USSR and consequently to the basis for exploiting and utilizing the additional means of acquiring information under an inspection system.

a. Given the state of our knowledge of developments within the USSR, can we draw up a list of intelligence requirements which would insure adequate coverage of the danger points?

b. Would an extended period of "cut and try" be necessary before we could rely on an inspection program to the degree anticipated by the President's proposal?

B. Means of Inspection

1. Military Blueprints

A "complete military blueprint" is an exhaustive and accurate listing of forces, their disposition, strength and equipment, and installations of a military or military-supporting nature.

a. What are the limitations inherent in such a means of acquiring information?

b. What are the possibilities for deception and concealment?

c. Frequency of exchange

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- d. Estimate of quantity
- e. Methods of checking and confirming
- f. How far would a complete military blueprint go in satisfaction of the requirements?
- g. If anything less than a complete blueprint is involved, what is the minimum acceptable?

2. Aerial reconnaissance (photography)

- a. What are the limitations inherent in such a means of acquiring information?
- b. What are the optimum and minimum acceptable conditions (altitude, equipment, freedom of movement)?
- c. What are the possibilities for deception and concealment?
- d. What frequency is required for critical intelligence targets?
- e. Estimate of quantity
- f. Methods of checking and confirming
- g. How far would aerial photography go in satisfaction of the requirements?

3. Relation between blueprints and aerial photography and assessment of their combined results in fulfillment of intelligence requirements.

4. Other means of inspection, such as:

- a. Aerial reconnaissance to include electronic, visual, and other techniques in addition to photography.
- b. Ground observer teams.

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C. Re-examination of US advance and early-warning capabilities

1. What provision must be made for most rapid processing and communication of information obtained?
2. Assessment of possible advantages to be gained for US intelligence as compared with present situation.
3. Possible disadvantages.

D. Possible Implications

NOTE: The considerations which follow are more appropriately dealt with in a National Estimate and not as part of the Task Force's study.

1. Would implementation of the President's proposal be interpreted in world opinion as effectively negating the possibility of nuclear warfare?
2. If so, does the proposal offer greater freedom of action to the Communists in other fields of conflict or competition?
3. If the possibility of nuclear warfare has acted as an inhibitor, what will be the effect of its apparent removal on "little" and "local" wars or on the prosecution of Communist influence by means short of limited war in critical and undecided areas?

V. CONCLUSION

Nature and degree of the security which would accrue to the US from an implementation of the President's proposal.